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Abstract
We study the decision of two firms within an oligopoly concerning
whether to enter into a horizontal agreement to exploit complemen-
tarities between their R&D activities and, if so, whether to merge or
form a research joint venture (RJV). In contrast to horizontal merger,
there is a probability that an RJV contract will fail to enforce R&D
sharing. We find that a horizontal agreement always arises. The in-
siders’ merger/RJV choice involves a trade-off: While merger offers
certainty that R&D complementarities will be exploited, it leads to
a profit-reducing reaction by outsiders on the product market, where
competition is Cournot. Greater brand similarity and contract enforce-
ability (“quality”) both favour RJV, while greater R&D complemen-
tarity favours merger. Interestingly, the insiders may choose to merge
even when RJV contracts are always enforceable, and they may opt
to form an RJV even when the likelihood of enforceability is negligible.
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1 Introduction
Within an industry, there are often complementarities between rival firms’
R&D activities, in the sense that their research efforts are not perfect substi-
tutes.1 It is thus natural that firms should seek to find methods of exploiting
such R&D complementarities to their mutual benefit. In this paper, we ex-
amine the choice between two such methods, horizontal merger and research
joint venture (RJV).2 Both horizontal merger and RJV facilitate the sharing
of R&D results; however, in an RJV, the participating firms remain inde-
pendent entities who maximise their own profits, whereas decisions within
a merged firm are taken to maximise joint profits.
We model an oligopolistic industry, where firms compete both in process
R&D and, subsequently, in outputs, and we focus on the decision of two
firms concerning whether to enter into a horizontal agreement to exploit
R&D complementarities and, if so, whether to merge or form an RJV.3
Surprisingly, to the best of our knowledge, this “merger versus RJV” decision
has received no attention in the vast theoretical literature on the organisation
of R&D. This paper fills that gap.
An episode in the corporate history of BP (formerly British Petroleum),
the third-largest energy company in the world, nicely illustrates some of
the salient issues in the merger/RJV decision. In 2000, the Federal Trade
Commission approved the mega-merger between BP (then called BP Amoco)
and the Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) partly on the grounds that,
by committing the firms to sharing their accumulated technical expertise,
it would significantly reduce extraction costs at the enormous Prudhoe Bay
oil field in Alaska.
1For example, Kamien et al. (1992, p.1298) characterise the R&D process as involving
trial and error (“it is a multidimensional heuristic rather than a one-dimensional algorith-
mic process”), with each firm simultaneously pursuing several avenues of research, only
some of which pay off.
2Gugler and Siebert (2007), for example, find that both mergers and RJVs in the
semiconductor industry are associated with substantial efficiency gains, which they partly
attribute to the internalisation of positive R&D externalities. Andrade et al. (2001) pro-
vide empirical evidence that “synergies” from combining firms’ R&D stocks often motivate
horizontal merger. For RJVs, Herna`n et al. (2003) find that the potential for technologies
to spill over to other firms positively influences RJV formation, and Veugelers (1998, p.
420) states that empirical evidence “suggests that exploiting complementarities is a major
motive for cooperation in R&D”.
3We focus on a single, bilateral agreement for simplicity.
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Competition policy practitioners typically argue that an RJV is socially
preferred to a horizontal merger because, while both institutional struc-
tures facilitate the exploitation of R&D complementarities, an RJV has the
added virtue that it preserves product-market competition between the par-
ticipants. In response to this objection, BP and ARCO persuasively argued
that, in their case, over twenty years of contractual experiments to gain the
benefits of information pooling had failed.4
Our model aims to capture some of the features of the BP/ARCO case
study. In particular, we develop the notion that, relative to an RJV, a
horizontal merger is more “effective” at inducing participating firms to pool
their R&D results. This was the BP/ARCO claim, and it is intuitively
appealing because, within an RJV, firms, who remain independent, have
a strong incentive not to reveal all of their R&D results to their partners.
RJVs attempt to address this problem through the use of contracts that
are signed when they are established, but such contracts might fail to be
enforceable ex post (i.e. after R&D results have been realised). Therefore,
for the insiders, a horizontal merger, which precommits them to pooling
R&D outputs (through the objective of joint profit maximisation), can be
an attractive alternative to forming an RJV – independently of market power
considerations.
An innovation of our analysis with respect to the existing literature on
RJVs is that we allow for the possibility that the RJV contract might fail to
enforce R&D sharing by the insiders.5 This is consistent with the empirical
evidence surveyed by Veugelers (1998, p. 420), which “suggests that coop-
eration carries a disturbingly high risk of failure”. Underlying this, R&D
“verifiability” – that is, observability by courts – is a crucial element in our
analysis. In advance of results emerging from the research lab, both the
quantitative and the qualitative nature of R&D output are typically un-
known. This makes it very tough to write an RJV contract that describes
R&D results across all possible states of the world sufficiently precisely to
4In the jargon, the efficiencies were “merger-specific”. For more information on the
BP/ARCO merger, see Farrell and Shapiro (2001, p. 705), Bulow and Shapiro (2004),
and http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/712962.stm.
5Another innovation is that we allow for the presence of outsider firms – i.e. the RJV
covers only a subset of firms within the industry. In Section 5 we discuss the implications
of this for welfare analysis.
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ensure that courts can always enforce its sharing rules.6,7 The incomplete
nature of RJV contracts means that there is always a chance that any given
contract, which commits the insiders to sharing certain defined R&D out-
puts, will fail to be enforceable because the realised R&D results fall outside
the terms of the original contract. We capture the success/failure of the
RJV contract by assuming that it is enforceable with a certain probability,
which we term the “contract quality”, and we assume that firms maximise
expected profits.
Much of the remaining structure of our model is standard to facilitate
straightforward comparisons with existing results in the literature. We con-
sider an oligopoly containing initially-identical firms.8 The firms produce
substitute brands of a differentiated good (the demand system is linear), and
they compete a` la Cournot on the product market. Each firm has a constant
unit cost, which decreases at a constant rate in its own R&D investment.
Within a horizontal agreement (either a merged firm or an RJV whose con-
tract is enforceable), a firm can also access the other insider’s R&D, and our
model contains a parameter that measures the degree of R&D complemen-
tarity (i.e. the extent to which a partner’s R&D decreases a firm’s own unit
cost). Aside from such R&D sharing, there are no inter-firm R&D spillovers,
however.
Existing applied theory papers on horizontal mergers and RJVs have
tended to analyse the choice between a given type of horizontal agreement,
6To illustrate why precision is necessary in the RJV contract, consider for example
the case where the RJV relates to a single product, X, but one of the RJV members is a
multiproduct firm that operates a single R&D lab for all of its lines of business. Clearly,
the multiproduct firm would challenge an RJV contract that simply stated “share all
R&D related to X ” by claiming that any given piece of its R&D output related to another
product and so need not be disclosed within the RJV. Breadth is necessary in the RJV
contract because, even if it perfectly describes previous R&D output, the participating
firms have incentives to target potentially non-verifiable R&D activities.
7Aside from the problem of contract enforceability, our modelling of behaviour within
RJVs is identical to the “RJV competition” case of Kamien et al. (1992), where RJV
insiders set both their R&D and their output levels independently to maximise their own
profits. In the Conclusion, we discuss how our modelling of RJVs relates to Kamien et al.’s
other case of “RJV cartelization” (i.e. co-operation between RJV insiders in the setting of
R&D but competition in outputs), which could be interpreted as an attempt to solve the
contractual problems we consider by contracting all R&D activities out to a third party.
8Ro¨ller et al. (2007) present evidence from the US that RJVs are most likely to form
between firms of similar sizes.
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either merger or RJV, and no-agreement.9 Thus, our paper, which focusses
on the merger/RJV choice, is a bridge between those two literatures. Our
paper also fills a gap between the IO literature on RJVs (e.g. Kamien et
al., 1992), which typically assumes that RJV contracts are always enforce-
able, and that on incomplete contracts (e.g. Hart and Moore, 1990), which
typically abstracts from the effects of product-market competition by as-
suming bilateral monopoly-type interactions between firms in unrelated (or
vertically related) markets.10
Our first finding in Section 4 is that, for the two insiders, an RJV always
dominates the no-agreement outcome. This finding suggests that a hor-
izontal agreement, either merger or RJV, will always arise in equilibrium.
With identical firms, it is well established within the literature that industry
profits are maximised when all firms determine their R&D investments co-
operatively, and pool R&D results, but compete la Cournot in outputs;11
this set-up is termed RJV cartelization by Kamien et al. (1992). In con-
trast, our result relates to an RJV where R&D investments are determined
non-cooperatively and participation is limited to a subset of firms; thus, our
first result is a substantive contribution in itself.
Next, we invesigate the insiders’ merger/RJV choice. Our analysis here
can be related to that of Davidson and Ferrett (2007), who examine the in-
siders’ choice between horizontal merger and no-agreement within the same
modelling set-up as ours. Merger allows the exploitation of R&D comple-
mentarities, but the reaction that it provokes from outsiders on the product
market (where competition is Cournot), who expand their production in re-
sponse to the insiders’ attempts to restrict output and reach the monopoly
solution, works to undermine its profitability.12 Therefore, a profitability
9Key papers on the choice between horizontal merger and no-agreement are Salant et
al. (1983), and Deneckere and Davidson (1985). Davidson and Ferrett (2007) examine
the merger/no-agreement choice in the presence of endogenous R&D investments, as do
Cabolis et al. (2008) and Matsushima et al. (2009). For comparisons of RJV and no-
agreement, see, for example, d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Kamien et al. (1992),
Suzumura (1992), and Leahy and Neary (1997).
10A small literature (e.g. Pe´rez-Castrillo and Sandon´ıs, 1996; Tao and Wu, 1997; Pastor
and Sandon´ıs, 2002) examines the supply of effort and know-how by firms to joint research
projects in settings of contractual incompleteness. However, these papers do not consider
merger and they include minimal, if any, product-market interaction between the insiders
and no role for outside firms, who are crucial in our analysis.
11e.g. Kamien et al., 1992, theorem 1; Rller et al., 2007, p. 1128.
12The fact that the profitability of horizontal mergers under Cournot competition is
generally undermined by the reactions of outsider firms was highlighted by Salant et al.
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trade-off between merger and no-agreement emerges: greater R&D comple-
mentarity favours merger but greater brand similarity, which means stronger
product-market interactions, favours no-agreement.
In our model, RJV resembles no-agreement in that, in both scenarios, all
firms in the industry make both their R&D and their production decisions
independently to maximise their own (expected) profits. However, unlike no-
agreement, RJV does allow some probability that R&D complementarities
will be successfully exploited. This is what lies behind our finding, discussed
above, that the insiders always prefer RJV to no-agreement. It thus follows
that the size of the region in parameter space where merger dominates no-
agreement will be larger than that where merger dominates RJV.
The insiders’ merger/RJV choice entails a trade-off: while merger of-
fers a higher probability than RJV that R&D complementarities will be
successfully exploited, it tends to be less profitable, ceteris paribus,13 than
RJV on the product market. In product-market competition, merger suf-
fers in comparison with RJV for the same reason that it underperforms
no-agreement: the profitability of merger is undermined by the reactions
of outsiders. Therefore, to maintain indifference between merger and RJV
on the part of the insiders, greater brand similarity (which heightens the
exposure of the merged firm to the reactions of outsiders) must be coun-
terbalanced by a lower contract quality (or probability of contract enforce-
ability). We also show that a rise in the degree of R&D complementarity
makes merger “more likely” relative to RJV, in the sense that the region in
parameter space where merger is chosen grows in size.
Finally, we derive two surprising and interesting results that relate to the
extremes of brand similarity. First, we show that the insiders may optimally
choose to merge even when RJV contracts are “perfect” (i.e. always enforce-
able); this requires a low level of brand similarity. Secondly, on the contrary,
we show that the insiders may optimally choose to form an RJV even when
the probability of contract enforceability is negligible; this requires a high
level of brand similarity.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents
(1983). In the Conclusion, we consider how our model would work with Bertrand (price)
competition in the product market.
13i.e. for a given vector of marginal costs across all firms.
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our model, and Section 3 presents the equilibrium solutions for the three
possible agreement choices by the insiders: no-agreement, horizontal merger,
and RJV. Section 4 analyses the insiders’ no-agreement/merge/RJV choice,
and Section 5 presents a brief illustrative welfare analysis. Finally, Section
6 concludes by relating our results back to the BP/ARCO case study and
considering some possible extensions.
2 Model
There are N (initially identical) firms, each producing a single brand of a
differentiated good. Firm i’s price and quantity are denoted by pi and qi
respectively, and the brand inverse demand function is
pi = a− qi − βq−i (1)
where a is a constant, β ∈ [0, 1] measures brand similarity,14 and q−i ≡∑
j 6=i
qj . (β will also measure the strength of strategic interaction on the
product market.) Initially, each firm operates with the same constant unit
cost, c, and there are no fixed costs. There is no entry into the industry,
and a > c.
Firms 1 and 2 have two possible means of exploiting complementarities
between their R&D activities: horizontal merger (HM) and research joint
venture (RJV). We consider the following sequence of moves: in stage 0,
firms 1 and 2 choose between NA (no agreement), HM, and RJV; in stage
1, all firms simultaneously choose how much to invest in process R&D; and
in stage 2, all firms compete a` la Cournot on the product market. We
assume complete information, and we solve the game backwards to isolate
its subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
The stage 0 choice between NA, HM and RJV affects the insiders’ (firms
1 and 2) costs and their subsequent behaviour. The NA case, where firms
1 and 2 remain independent, is the easiest to consider because all the firms
in the industry are symmetric. Firm i′s total cost of R&D is (γ/2)x2i , where
14Thus, β = 0 represents independent goods, and β = 1 represents identical brands.
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γ is a constant. Under NA, this R&D expenditure lowers its unit cost to
c− xi.15
Under HM, the subsequent R&D and output decisions of firms 1 and 2
are made to maximise their joint profits. Horizontal merger guarantees that
R&D complementarities will be exploited, so firm 1’s unit cost is c1 = c−x1−
θx2 (an analogous expression holds for firm 2), where θ ∈ [0, 1] measures the
degree of R&D complementarity. (This specification for the insiders’ unit
costs follows d’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988.) The outsiders under HM,
firms 3, 4, ..., N , behave like the firms in the NA case.
Under RJV, firms 1 and 2 agree in a contract, signed before R&D in-
vestments are decided, to share their R&D results before the start of stage
2 (product market competition). However, after R&D results have been
realised, this contract turns out to be enforceable only with probability ω,
which measures “contract quality”. Thus, ω can also be interpreted as the
probability that R&D outputs are observable by courts, or “verifiable”.16
(In a nutshell, the problem is that the RJV contract, written in advance of
R&D activity being undertaken, cannot exhaustively and precisely catalogue
R&D output in every possible state of the world. Such breadth of coverage
is necessary, however, because RJV insiders have a strong incentive not to
share their research outputs.17) We will sometimes refer to contract enforce-
ability as “RJV success” and to contract unenforceability as “RJV failure”,
and we assume that RJV success/failure becomes common knowledge.
If, in the light of the insiders’ R&D outputs, the RJV contract turns out
to be unenforceable (with probability 1− ω), then the RJV insiders have a
dominant strategy not to share their R&D results (because they can do so
with impunity) and their unit cost functions in stage 2 are as under NA, e.g.
c1 = c− x1. Alternatively, if the RJV contract turns out to be enforceable,
then it will ensure that the insiders pool their R&D results and the insiders’
unit cost functions in stage 2 will be as under HM, e.g. c1 = c− x1 − θx2.
15There are no inter-firm spillovers from R&D. Essentially, we are concerned with cases
where intra-firm R&D spillovers (within a horizontal agreement) are significantly greater
than inter-firm R&D spillovers.
16Note that we are assuming, for simplicity, that the R&D outputs of both insiders
always have the same verifiability/non-verifiability status. Thus, it is impossible, for
example, for firm 1’s R&D output to be verifiable (and its contractual commitment to
share R&D therefore to be enforceable) while firm 2’s is not.
17See, for example, the case discussed in the Introduction where an RJV contains a
multiproduct firm.
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In the RJV scenario, all firms (both insiders and outsiders) make both
their R&D and their output choices independently to maximize their own
expected profits (outsiders, of course, have access only to their own R&D
results),18 and all firms are risk neutral.
3 Equilibrium solutions19
3.1 No agreement between firms (NA)
In stage 2, the common first-order condition (FOC) for output is
pi − ci = qi (2)
where ci = c − xi and xi is fixed. Solving the system of simultaneous
equations, we get firm i’s equilibrium output:
qi =
(2− β) a+ βCF −∆0ci
(2− β) ∆0 (3)
where CF ≡ Nc−
∑N
1
xi is the sum of marginal costs when firms 1 and
2 fail to share R&D, and ∆0 ≡ 2 + β (N − 1).20
In stage 1, xi is set to maximise Πi = q
2
i − γ2x2i . Imposing symmetry
(xi = xNA ∀i) on the resulting FOC and solving gives
xNA =
2 (∆0 − β) (a− c)
(2− β) γ∆20 − 2 (∆0 − β)
(4)
18In terms of the Kamien et al. (1992) taxonomy, this corresponds to the case of “RJV
competition”. Having the RJV insiders compete both in R&D investments and in outputs
also nicely captures the institutional fact that, in an RJV, the insiders remain independent
firms (unlike following a horizontal merger).
19We report the equilibrium solutions for the NA and HM cases relatively briefly as
they are covered in-depth in Davidson and Ferrett (2007).
20(3) can be derived by summing (2) over all firms to derive the equilibrium industry
output and then substituting this back into (2).
9
as the common equilibrium level of R&D output.21 The common equi-
librium level of profits, ΠNA, can be found by substituting (4) into (3) and
using Πi = q
2
i − γ2x2i .
3.2 Horizontal merger (HM)
In stage 2, the insiders to the merger (firms 1 and 2) set q1 and q2 to maximise
(p1 − c1) q1 + (p2 − c2) q2, while the outsiders behave like the firms in the
NA game. Therefore, the FOCs for output are
p1 − c1 = q1 + βq2
p2 − c2 = q2 + βq1
pj − cj = qj ∀j ≥ 3
 (5)
where c1 = c− x1 − θx2, c2 = c− x2 − θx1, and cj = c− xj ∀j ≥ 3; and
all the x’s are fixed.22
The equilibrium outputs are
q1 + q2 =
(2−β)a+βCS−∆0
2
(c1+c2)
∆1
qj =
(2−β)a+βCS−β2
2
(c1+c2)−∆1cj
(2−β)∆1 , ∀j ≥ 3
 (6)
where CS ≡ Nc− (1 + θ) (x1 + x2)−
∑n
3 xj is the sum of marginal costs
when firms 1 and 2 share R&D, and ∆1 ≡ ∆0 − β2.
In stage 1, the merged firm sets x1 and x2 to maximise Π1 + Π2 =
q21 + q
2
2 + 2βq1q2 − γ2
(
x21 + x
2
2
)
, while the outsiders behave like the firms in
21There are two restrictions on γ. The second-order condition is γ >
2 (∆0 − β)2 / ((2 − β) ∆0)2, and the condition for positive equilibrium marginal costs
(c > x) is γ > 2 (∆0 − β) a/ (2 − β) ∆20c. We ensure that both conditions hold in what
follows, along with analogous conditions for the HM and RJV cases.
22It is clear from the FOCs in (5) that merger leads to a restriction of output by the
insiders relative to the outsiders. For example, if p1 − c1 = q1 (as for an outsider) then
p1 − c1 < q1 + βq2, so q1 will be reduced.
10
the NA game. Differentiating then imposing symmetry (x1 = x2 = x
IN
HM
and xj = x
OUT
HM ∀j ≥ 3) on the FOCs and solving gives23
xINHM =
m2m4−m1m6
m2m5−m3m6 (a− c)
xOUTHM =
m1m5−m3m4
m2m5−m3m6 (a− c)
}
(7)
where
m1 = (1 + β) (2− β) (1 + θ) (∆0 − 2β)
m2 = β (1 + β) (1 + θ) (N − 2) (∆0 − 2β)
m3 = 2γ∆
2
1 − (1 + β) (1 + θ)2 (∆0 − 2β)2
m4 = 2 (∆1 − β)
m5 = m4β (1 + θ)
m6 = γ (2− β) ∆21 −m4 (1 + β)
Equilibrium profits, ΠINHM and Π
OUT
HM , are found by substituting from
(7) into (6) and using ΠINHM = (1 + β)
(
qINHM
)2 − γ2 (xINHM)2 while ΠOUTHM =(
qOUTHM
)2 − γ2 (xOUTHM )2.24
3.3 Research Joint Venture (RJV)
The RJV comprises firms 1 and 2. Unit costs depend on R&D investments
in stage 1 and also on whether the RJV succeeds or fails. Therefore, the sum
of marginal costs over all firms is CS with probability ω (the RJV succeeds)
and CF with probability 1− ω (the RJV fails).
Stage 2 under RJV is qualitatively identical to stage 2 under NA; see
(3) above. In stage 1 under RJV, firm 1 chooses x1 to maximize expected
profits:
23The FOC for x1 with symmetry imposed is 2 (1 + β) q
IN
HM · ∂ (q1 + q2) /∂x1 = γxINHM .
To derive qINHM , the equilibrium output of an insider, impose symmetry on q1 + q2 in (6)
and divide by 2.
24Here, qINHM and q
OUT
HM are, as the notation implies, the equilibrium production levels
of an insider and an outsider respectively.
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ω(
(2− β) a+ βCS −∆0 (c− x1 − θx2)
(2− β) ∆0
)2
(8)
+ (1− ω)
(
(2− β) a+ βCF −∆0 (c− x1)
(2− β) ∆0
)2
− γ
2
x21
with an analogous expression applying to firm 2; while an RJV outsider
(j ≥ 3) chooses xj to maximize
ω
(
(2− β) a+ βCS −∆0 (c− xj)
(2− β) ∆0
)2
(9)
+ (1− ω)
(
(2− β) a+ βCF −∆0 (c− xj)
(2− β) ∆0
)2
− γ
2
x2j .
Imposing symmetry (x1 = x2 = x
IN
RJV and xj = x
OUT
RJV ∀j ≥ 3) on the
resulting FOCs and solving gives
xINRJV =
r2r4−r1r6
r2r5−r3r6 (a− c)
xOUTRJV =
r1r5−r3r4
r2r5−r3r6 (a− c)
}
(10)
where
r1 = (2− β) [∆0 − (1 + θω)β]
r2 = β (N − 2) [∆0 − (1 + θω)β]
r3 =
γ
2
(2− β)2 ∆20 − (∆0 − 2β) [(∆0 − β) (1 + θω)− θ (1 + θ)ωβ]
r4 = (2− β) (∆0 − β)
r5 = 2β (1 + θω) (∆0 − β)
r6 =
γ
2
(2− β)2 ∆20 − (2 + β) (∆0 − β)
Equilibrium profits, ΠINRJV and Π
OUT
RJV , are found by substituting from
(10) into (8) and (9).
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4 Results
4.1 RJV dominates NA
Our first finding is that, for the insiders, RJV always dominates NA.25 That
is, ΠINRJV ≥ ΠNA for all parameter values, with strict inequality if both θ and
ω are non-zero. This finding is illustrated in Figure 1, which compares R&D
investments and profits under NA and RJV for specific parameter values.
It is also evident from the numerical analysis presented in the Appendix,
which is the subject of Section 5 below, and from extensive numerical simu-
lations that the authors have undertaken.26 However, as is often the case in
models of multi-stage competition such as the present one, the complexity of
the equilibrium solutions means that an analytical proof is, unfortunately,
beyond reach.27
25An analogous finding holds for society as a whole, as we show in Section 5.
26Details available on request.
27Moreover, the asymmetry of the RJV equilibrium in our model further complicates
the NA/RJV comparison.
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Figure 1
NA versus RJV: R&D investment and profits
(a = 10, β = 0.5, c = 5, γ = 2, n = 6, θ = 0.5)
xNA
piNA
xRJV IN
xRJV OUT
piRJV IN
piRJV OUT
Despite this, the intuition for ΠINRJV ≥ ΠNA in Figure 1 is both clear
and strong. First, note that if either θ or ω equals zero (i.e. there are no
R&D complementarities or RJV contracts are guaranteed to fail), then the
RJV game is identical to the NA game. This explains the common vertical
intercepts in Figure 1.
Now assume that both θ and ω are strictly positive. We can interpret
the message of Figure 1 (ΠINRJV > ΠNA > Π
OUT
RJV and x
IN
RJV > xNA > x
OUT
RJV )
as follows. Assume, first, that every firm’s R&D level is fixed at xNA and
that only outputs can be varied. If, in this situation, two firms enter into a
contract to pool their R&D stocks (as in an RJV), then their marginal costs
will fall with probability ω and their expected profits will rise as, if the RJV
succeeds, they expand on the product market at the expense of the N − 2
outsiders.
Next, allow R&D levels to vary. The rise in insider output just described
increases the “marginal benefit” (or marginal variable profit) to an insider
of R&D since cost reductions are now spread over a larger quantity of pro-
14
duction. Hence, both insider R&D investment and insider profits rise. The
response of outsiders to higher R&D investment by the firms in the RJV is
to retrench: they are squeezed on the product market, and cut their R&D
levels. In turn, this reaction by the outsiders benefits the insiders.
It is clear that ceteris paribus (specifically, holding the R&D levels of
outsiders fixed) the insiders would benefit from the move from NA to RJV.
Our argument has sought to show that the reaction of outsiders – specifically,
the fact that they cut R&D investment in response to being squeezed on the
product market following the formation of an RJV – is also beneficial to the
insiders. Thus, we have charted a path from the NA to the RJV equilibrium
in Figure 1 along which an insider’s profits are always increasing.
In Figure 1, while ΠNA is independent of ω, Π
IN
RJV is increasing in ω.
This feature holds generally throughout all of our numerical simulations, and
it is the basis for our conclusion that RJV is more profitable for the insiders
than NA. (Another feature of Figure 1 – the fact that xINRJV is increasing in
ω, so xINRJV > xNA – is not quite so robust. Specifically, if γ is sufficiently
large, then we get xINRJV < xNA when both θ and ω are strictly positive.
28)
Finally, note that we have assumed that firms’ non-R&D fixed costs
are independent of the NA/HM/RJV choice. However, this might not be
the case. If, for example, there were even an infinitesimal fixed cost of
implementing a horizontal agreement (either RJV or HM), then NA would
dominate RJV if ω is sufficiently small.29 On the contrary, of course, both
RJV and (especially) HM might present opportunities for savings in non-
R&D fixed costs through the avoidance of duplication (e.g. the sharing of
“back office” facilities) and “synergies”. Such savings are a further reason
28Intuitively, large γ implies that levels of R&D investment will be generally low
throughout the industry. This means that the production of an RJV insider is similar
in size to that of a firm under NA. Therefore, the marginal variable profit of R&D to an
RJV insider will be lower than that to a firm in NA, so xNA > x
IN
RJV . This occurs be-
cause the marginal variable profit of R&D depends both on the level of output and on how
output changes with R&D (i.e. ∂q2i /∂xi = 2qi · ∂qi/∂xi), and the latter is greater under
NA than for an RJV insider, who is committed to sharing additional R&D results with a
product-market competitor (this is the “competitive-advantage externality” in Kamien et
al., 1992).
29Moreover, since, as we show in the next section, (large β, small ω) implies that RJV
profit-dominates HM as long as θ is not too large, this shows how (with small ω and θ, and
large β) NA might be chosen in equilibrium in the presence of fixed costs of establishing
a horizontal agreement.
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for dropping NA from the equilibrium analysis.
The result that RJV is always more profitable for the insiders than NA
greatly simplifies our analysis by allowing us to drop NA. The equilibrium
choice is now between HM and RJV.
4.2 HM versus RJV: the central trade-off
Here we examine the insiders’ choice between RJV and HM. Given that RJV
always dominates NA (as we showed in the previous section), the RJV/HM
choice is also the equilibrium choice.
Davidson and Ferrett (2007) examine the insiders’ choice between HM
and NA. HM allows the exploitation of R&D complementarities, but the
reaction that it provokes from outsiders on the product market works to
undermine its profitability (as noted by Salant et al., 1983). Therefore, a
profitability trade-off between HM and NA emerges: higher θ favours HM
but higher β, which means stronger product-market interactions, favours
NA.
In our model, RJV resembles NA in that, in both scenarios, all firms
in the industry make both their R&D and their production decisions inde-
pendently to maximise their own (expected) profits. However, unlike NA,
RJV does allow some probability, ω, that R&D complementarities will be
exploited. This is what lies behind our finding, discussed above, that the
insiders always prefer RJV to NA. (It thus follows that the size of the region
in parameter space where HM dominates NA will be larger than that where
HM dominates RJV.)
Figure 2 below depicts the choice between HM and RJV, and the way in
which brand similarity, β, may be traded off against contract quality, ω, to
maintain indifference on the part of the insiders. The solid line in Figure 2
is the locus of points such that ΠINHM = Π
IN
RJV , and above (below) the locus
the insiders’ preferred horizontal agreement is RJV (HM).
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FIGURE 2: The insiders merger/RJV choice
(Along the solid line, piINHM = pi
IN
RJV )
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RJV
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0.6
0.8
1.0
Β
Ω
n = 10, Γ = 5, a-c = 10, Θ=0.3
While HM offers a higher probability than RJV that R&D complemen-
tarities will be exploited, it tends to be less profitable, for a given vector
of marginal costs across all firms, than RJV on the product market. In
product-market competition, HM suffers in comparison with RJV for the
same reason that it underperforms NA: the profitability of merger is un-
dermined by the reactions of outsiders. Therefore, to maintain indifference
between HM and RJV on the part of the two insiders, a higher β, which
increases the exposure of the merged firm to the reactions of outsiders, must
be counterbalanced by a lower ω (probability of contract enforceability),
which reduces the attractiveness of RJV. This explains why the HM/RJV
indifference locus in Figure 2 is downward sloping.
Figure 2 is drawn for a given value of R&D complementarities, θ. In
Figure 3 below, we vary the value of θ, and we see that increasing θ shifts
the insiders’ HM/RJV indifference locus outwards. Therefore, a rise in the
degree of R&D complementarity makes HM “more likely” relative to RJV,
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in the sense that the region in parameter space where HM is chosen grows
in size. This result is intuitive: a rise in θ increases the relative attractive-
ness of merger as a form of horizontal agreement because (unlike RJV) it
offers certainty that the now-more-significant R&D complementarities will
be successfully exploited. However, note that, even for “perfect” R&D com-
plementarity (i.e. θ = 1), it is still possible for the insiders to prefer RJV to
HM despite ω < 1.30 Typically, this requires high β, which (as we discussed
above) undermines the profitability of HM.
FIGURE 3: Greater R&D complementarities make merger more likely
(HM is chosen inside each indifference locus, and RJV outside)
Θ=0.1
Θ=0.4
Θ=0.7
Θ=0.9
Θ=1
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0.0
0.2
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0.6
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Ω
n = 10, Γ = 5, a-c = 10, Θ=0.1
Finally, we return to Figure 2. The HM/RJV indifference locus is rela-
tively steep, and this implies: firstly, that the insiders may optimally choose
HM even when ω = 1 (this requires low β); and secondly, that the insiders
may optimally choose RJV even when ω ≈ 0 (this requires high β).31
30We interpret θ = 1 as perfect R&D complementarity in the sense that it implies that
there is zero duplication between the insiders’ R&D activities.
31Recall that the insiders are indifferent between RJV and NA when ω = 0.
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Consider first the result that the insiders may choose merger even when
RJV contracts are always enforceable. To see why, assume that β = 0,
so that the brands are independent in demand and there are no strategic
interactions on the product market. Given our earlier discussion of how
product-market competition reduces the profitability of merger, one might
have thought that an RJV and a merger would be equivalent with β = 0
and ω = 1. However, in fact, HM strictly dominates RJV in this case
(if θ > 0): the insiders in the merged firm invest more in R&D and earn
greater profits than the RJV insiders. This occurs because merger leads to
the internalisation of an externality: one insider’s R&D spending benefits
the other insider,32 but this external benefit is only taken into account in
R&D determination under merger, where the insiders’ R&D investments are
set to maximise joint profits. (In contrast, an RJV insider sets her level of
R&D investment to maximise her own profits only.)
Our finding that, even with a negligible probability of contract enforce-
ability, the insiders may prefer RJV to HM requires relatively similar brands,
and it arises because the strong product-market interactions that accompany
similar brands work to make HM unprofitable.
The key results from this section are listed as bullet points at the start
of the conclusion in Section 6 below.
5 Illustrative Welfare Analysis
In this section we briefly report the salient findings of an exploratory numer-
ical exercise that we have undertaken to investigate the model’s normative
properties. Numerical values for profits and social welfare, which form the
basis for our results, are reported in the Appendix. We use the following
standard expression for social welfare (or surplus):
W = a
N∑
1
qi − 1
2
N∑
1
q2i − β
N−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
qiqj −
N∑
1
ciqi − γ
2
N∑
1
x2i (11)
32Kamien et al. (1992) call this the “combined-profits externality”.
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This is merely utility minus production and R&D costs.33 In the NA
equilibrium, where all firms are identical, social welfare is
WNA = N (a− c+ xNA) qNA − N
2
[1 + β (N − 1)] q2NA −N
γ
2
x2NA (12)
The expression for social welfare in the HM game is more complicated
because of the asymmetry between insiders and outsiders:
WHM = a
(
2qINHM + (N − 2) qOUTHM
)− 1
2
[
2
(
qINHM
)2
+ (N − 2) (qOUTHM )2] (13)
−β
[(
qINHM
)2
+ 2 (N − 2) qINHMqOUTHM +
1
2
(N − 3) (N − 2) (qOUTHM )2]
−2 [c− (1 + θ)xINHM] qINHM − (N − 2) (c− xOUTHM ) qOUTHM
−γ
2
[
2
(
xINHM
)2
+ (N − 2) (xOUTHM )2]
and the social welfare expression for RJV can be derived by straightfor-
ward analogy.
Our first finding is that, socially, RJV always dominates NA; that is,
WRJV > WNA for every set of parameter values. This holds regardless of
the absence or presence of outside firms (i.e. in both the n = 2 and n = 5
cases). This finding is analogous to the result we derived in section 4.1 above
on the ranking of insiders’ profits, and it is unsurprising because an RJV
allows R&D complementarities to be exploited without reducing the number
of independent firms on the product market.
Next, we compare the social-welfare performance of RJV and HM. Our
results here also hold independently of the absence/presence of outside
firms. First, we find that, for small degrees of R&D complementarity (θ =
0.1, 0.35), WRJV > WHM .
34 This conforms to a standard view amongst
competition-policy practitioners: RJV is to be socially preferred to horizon-
33The limits on the summations in the third term ensure that each pair of quantities is
interacted only once.
34The single, minor exception to this finding is with n = 5 and θ = 0.35. Here, WRJV
is very slightly less than WHM if ω = 0.1.
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tal merger because it preserves product-market competition.35 Second, for
intermediate degrees of R&D complementarity (θ = 0.65), we find that RJV
is socially preferred to HM if and only if contract quality is high (ω = 0.9).
One interpretation of this result is that poor contract quality makes the
gains from a horizontal agreement “merger-specific”(in the sense of Farrell
and Shapiro, 2001).
Third, for substantial R&D complementarities (θ = 0.9), we find that
HM socially dominates RJV for all levels of contract quality. (Thus, HM
can be socially preferred to RJV even when contracts are always enforceable
– i.e. when the sharing of R&D results is not “merger-specific”.) This arises
for the same reason that the insiders can strictly prefer HM to RJV when
ω = 1 (see Section 4.2): R&D investment by one insider creates a positive
externality for the other insider, and this is only internalised under HM.
Finally, we compare the private incentives of the insiders with the social
preference between HM and RJV. As one would expect, HM is always chosen
in equilibrium when there are no outside firms (n = 2). Therefore, given the
discussion of society’s merger/RJV preference above, we can conclude that
HM is chosen “too often” relative to RJV in the absence of outsiders. This
is because consumers tend to benefit from the competition between insiders
in the RJV case.
With outside firms (n = 5), the insiders might choose to form an RJV in
equilibrium.36 (The presence of outsiders on the product market works to
undermine the profitability of bilateral merger under Cournot competition.)
Although merger is chosen less frequently than in the absence of outsiders, it
is still chosen “too often” from a social perspective.37 However, it appears
that the presence of outside firms works to align the preferences of the
insiders with those of society. (We conjecture that this arises because the
presence of outsiders weakens the insiders’ preference for merger, but it also
strengthens society’s preference for merger since, in the majority of cases,
35There is, of course, a debate, into which we do not enter here, concerning the welfare
standard that is used in practice in competition policy (e.g. social welfare, consumer
surplus, or some mix of the two).
36Low R&D complementarities (θ = 0.1) favour RJV, and high ones (θ = 0.65, 0.9)
favour HM. For intermediate R&D complementarities (θ = 0.35), the insiders only form
an RJV when contract quality is high (ω = 0.9).
37There are only two cases where the insiders’ preferences diverge from society’s:
(θ = 0.35, ω = 0.5) and (θ = 0.65, ω = 0.9). In both of those, society prefers an RJV but
the insiders choose to merge.
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the outsiders prefer HM to RJV.)
A task for future work is to investigate the robustness of these suggestive
welfare findings.38
6 Conclusion and Discussion
Our key contribution has been to examine the choice between horizontal
merger and RJV as alternative vehicles for exploiting R&D complementar-
ities, whereas most existing contributions examine just one of those forms
of horizontal agreement in isolation. An innovation in our modelling struc-
ture is that we have allowed for the possibility that RJV contracts might be
unenforceable.
Our key positive findings are as follows:
• For the two insiders, RJV always dominates no-agreement, so some
form of horizontal agreement (merger or RJV) always arises in equi-
librium.
• Merger/RJV tradeoff: While merger offers certainty that R&D com-
plementarities will be successfully exploited, it leads to an aggressive
and profit-reducing reaction by outsiders on the product market. Rises
in both brand similarity and contract quality favour RJV over merger.
• A rise in the degree of R&D complementarity makes merger “more
likely” relative to RJV. However, RJV may continue to be chosen
even with perfect R&D complementarity.
• Surprisingly, the two insiders may optimally choose to merge even
when RJV contracts are always enforceable (this requires a low degree
of brand similarity); and they may optimally choose to form an RJV
even when the probability of contract enforceability is negligible (this
requires a high degree of brand similarity).
38In particular, one might add a social indifference locus to a diagram like Figure 2.
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How do our results relate to the BP/ARCO case study that motivated
our analysis? If we assume that crude oil is a relatively homogeneous product
and that the degree of R&D complementarity is high (so that both β and θ
are close to 1), then we can see from Figure 3 that the insiders will, as BP and
ARCO did, prefer merger to RJV when contract quality is low. Moreover,
the welfare analysis in Section 5 is also relevant. There, we showed that
society prefers merger to RJV when R&D complementarities are substantial
but contract quality is low.39,40 Therefore, our results suggest that a merger
with the characteristics of BP/ARCO might benefit both the insiders and
society.41
To close, we briefly consider three possible generalisations of our anal-
ysis. The first is to allow for Bertrand (price) competition on the product
market. We conjecture that our qualitative results will not survive this gen-
eralisation. This is because, under Bertrand competition, horizontal mergers
are generally profitable for market-power reasons alone.42 Therefore, given
that merger offers a greater chance of realising R&D complementarities, it
is difficult to see why an RJV would ever be formed in a Bertrand market.
The second avenue for generalisation involves considering additional ve-
hicles for exploiting R&D complementarities. Given that the insiders intend
to pool their R&D results, there are, in principle, four distinct ways in
which they could manage their R&D and output decisions. Our analysis
has considered two of these: RJV, where the insiders choose their R&D and
production levels independently of each other to maximise their own prof-
its; and horizontal merger, where the R&D and output decisions of inside
brands are co-ordinated to maximise joint profits.
However, there are two other potential set-ups that the insiders could
adopt. The first involves collusion in R&D but competition in outputs.
Kamien et al. (1992) refer to this as “RJV cartelization”, and it might
conceivably be achieved in two ways: the RJV insiders could contract all
39Although the numerical analysis in Section 5 was conducted for a moderate degree of
brand similarity (β = 0.5), this finding continues to hold for β close to 1.
40Indeed, with substantial R&D complementarities, society can prefer merger to RJV
even if contracts are always enforceable. The intuition here follows that given for the
insiders towards the end of Section 4.2.
41Low RJV contract quality makes the “efficiencies” merger-specific, which qualifies the
usual preference of competition policy practitioners for RJV over merger.
42See, for example, Deneckere and Davidson (1985).
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of their R&D activities out to a third party with instructions to maximise
joint profits; or they could merge and implement “divisionalization” (in the
sense of Baye et al., 1996) on the product market. For our purposes, it is
important to note that both of these approaches might well involve their own
significant contractual problems.43 However, setting these to one side, we
conjecture that such “RJV cartelization”, if successfully implemented, would
always dominate our RJV option. Secondly, the insiders might compete in
R&D but collude in outputs – the “semi-collusion” case of Fershtman and
Gandal (1994), and Brod and Shivakumar (1999). In the Cournot setting,
where mergers for market-power reasons alone are generally unprofitable,
we conjecture that the insiders will prefer our RJV option to such “semi-
collusion”.
Thirdly, we could allow for endogenous RJV and merger size, rather
than restricting horizontal agreements to just two participants. In compar-
ison with the no-agreement outcome, where all firms remain independent,
it seems likely that, if legally permitted, an RJV would expand to include
the entire industry. However, it is unclear whether the same is true of a
horizontal merger of variable size (because merger tends to make the insid-
ers less aggressive on the product market, which benefits outsiders). Thus,
it is possible that the optimal RJV and the optimal merger would include
different numbers of insiders.
The systematic investigation of these conjectures remains a task for fu-
ture work.
43For example, if the RJV insiders contract out their R&D work, then the third party
will require ongoing access to their accumulated R&D stocks and technical expertise (see
Bhattacharya et al. (1992) for an early analysis). This could well present similar contrac-
tual complications to those we analyse. The key point (and the key contrast with merger)
is that, within an RJV, firms remain independent entities whose ultimate concern is with
their own profits.
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Appendix: Numerical values for the illustrative wel-
fare analysis in Section 5
All values are reported to three decimal places
Maintained values: a = 10, β = 0.5, c = 5, γ = 4
No outsiders (n = 2)
WNA = 16.117
ΠNA = 4.299
θ = 0.1 θ = 0.35
ω = 0.1
WRJV = 16.153 WRJV = 16.224
ΠINRJV = 4.311 Π
IN
RJV = 4.339
WHM = 14.421 WHM = 15.618
ΠINHM = 4.634 Π
IN
HM = 4.913
ω = 0.5
WRJV = 16.296 WRJV = 16.734
ΠINRJV = 4.356 Π
IN
RJV = 4.494
ω = 0.9
WRJV = 16.437 WRJV = 17.191
ΠINRJV = 4.400 Π
IN
RJV = 4.639
θ = 0.65 θ = 0.9
ω = 0.1
WRJV = 16.335 WRJV = 16.448
ΠINRJV = 4.374 Π
IN
RJV = 4.404
WHM = 17.750 WHM = 20.443
ΠINHM = 5.389 Π
IN
HM = 5.959
ω = 0.5
WRJV = 17.233 WRJV = 17.622
ΠINRJV = 4.654 Π
IN
RJV = 4.780
ω = 0.9
WRJV = 17.991 WRJV = 19.550
ΠINRJV = 4.898 Π
IN
RJV = 5.084
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Outsiders present (n = 5)
WNA = 21.178
ΠNA = 1.509
θ = 0.1 θ = 0.35
ω = 0.1
WRJV = 21.191 WRJV = 21.226
ΠINRJV = 1.514 Π
IN
RJV = 1.528
WHM = 20.874 Π
OUT
RJV = 1.507 WHM = 21.230 Π
OUT
RJV = 1.503
ΠINHM = 1.473 Π
IN
HM = 1.620
ΠOUTHM = 1.749 Π
OUT
HM = 1.658
ω = 0.5
WRJV = 21.244 WRJV = 21.416
ΠINRJV = 1.536 Π
IN
RJV = 1.606
ΠOUTRJV = 1.500 Π
OUT
RJV = 1.480
ω = 0.9
WRJV = 21.298 WRJV = 21.607
ΠINRJV = 1.558 Π
IN
RJV = 1.685
ΠOUTRJV = 1.494 Π
OUT
RJV = 1.457
θ = 0.65 θ = 0.9
ω = 0.1
WRJV = 21.269 WRJV = 21.306
ΠINRJV = 1.546 Π
IN
RJV = 1.561
WHM = 21.971 Π
OUT
RJV = 1.498 WHM = 23.136 Π
OUT
RJV = 1.494
ΠINHM = 1.897 Π
IN
HM = 2.281
ΠOUTHM = 1.493 Π
OUT
HM = 1.281
ω = 0.5
WRJV = 21.631 WRJV = 21.816
ΠINRJV = 1.694 Π
IN
RJV = 1.768
ΠOUTRJV = 1.456 Π
OUT
RJV = 1.437
ω = 0.9
WRJV = 21.992 WRJV = 22.319
ΠINRJV = 1.841 Π
IN
RJV = 1.973
ΠOUTRJV = 1.414 Π
OUT
RJV = 1.380
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